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SOVEREIGNTY AND DELEGATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
DAVID EPSTEIN* 
SHARYN O’HALLORAN** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Established in 1945, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations 
established to “contribute to peace and security by promoting international 
collaboration through education, science, and culture.”1 After a peaceful 
beginning, UNESCO became embroiled in controversy with the 1980 
publication of the MacBride Report, which called for the democratization of 
communication and strengthening of national media.2 The United States and 
the United Kingdom denounced the report as an attack on freedom of the press 
and criticized the organization in general as a platform for communist and 
Third World countries to attack the West.3 
The United States withdrew its funding for and membership in UNESCO in 
1984, followed by the United Kingdom the next year.4 In the ensuing decade, 
UNESCO toned down its rhetoric and reorganized itself to be less top-heavy. 
The United Kingdom eventually rejoined UNESCO in 1997,5 and the United 
States rejoined in 2003.6 How can we explain the exit and reentry of these two 
crucial countries? Why were they willing to be associated with UNESCO for 
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 1. Global Embassy, Goodwill Ambassadors UNESCO, http://www.globalembassy.org/ 
goodwillambass_UNESCO.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2007). 
 2. See Amit Mukherjee, International Protection of Journalists: Problem, Practice, and Prospects, 
11 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 339, 349 (1994). 
 3. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: 
International Organization: United States’ Return to UNESCO, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 977, 977–78 (2003). 
 4. Anna Gercas, The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights: Promoting 
International Discussion on the Morality of Non-Therapeutic Research on Children, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
629, 632 n.11 (2006). 
 5. The White House, Fact Sheet: United States Rejoins UNESCO, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2002/09/20020912-4.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2007). 
 6. U.S. Dep’t of State, United States of America and UNESCO: Building Knowledge, Bridging 
Culture, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/unesco/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2007). 
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one period of time but not another, and how did their behavior affect the 
organization’s policies? 
The UNESCO case highlights a key feature of delegation relationships 
within international organizations (IOs)—namely, that membership in such 
organizations is voluntary. What sets IOs apart from countries’ internal 
delegation regimes is the fact that if a country is not satisfied with the results it 
is obtaining via membership in the organization, it can simply exit, as the 
United States and the United Kingdom did from UNESCO, or simply decline 
to join the organization in the first place.7 This stands in contrast to, for 
instance, interbranch delegation; if Congress is unhappy with the executive’s 
use of delegated authority, it cannot simply leave and declare itself to be the 
national legislature of Bolivia instead. More to the point, any change in the 
delegation regime would itself be subject to a presidential veto, so each 
Congress is to some degree locked into the delegation arrangements inherited 
from previous Congresses. 
If IO membership is voluntary, why would countries delegate in the first 
place? We argue that international organizations are held together by network 
externalities, such as free trade, safety via nuclear nonproliferation, and so on. 
Specifically, a defining feature of international organizations is that the more 
countries that belong to them, the more benefits accrue to all members. In this 
sense, IOs display increasing returns to scale, similar to many social or Internet-
based resources. Conversely, the departure of key countries can do significant 
harm to an international organization, sometimes triggering a wave of 
defections.8 
This article provides a theory of delegation to IOs that incorporates free exit 
and network externalities into the standard delegation-modeling framework. 
What issues should such a theory to be able to address? 
1. It should predict an IO’s membership, including states’ decisions to 
enter and exit. 
2. It should predict the policy goals pursued by the IO; moreover, these 
policy goals should themselves affect membership. Formal models of 
IOs to date take either the policy choices or the member states as 
given, but the UNESCO example above makes clear that changes in 
policy can lead to changes in membership as well. 
 
 7. Whether exit is truly costless is open to debate; some international organizations place limits on 
the rights of their members to exit, although the degree to which these actually bind member states is 
unclear. For a full discussion, see generally Lawrence Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 
(2005). In any case, this article’s argument relates international conditions to an IO’s membership, 
whether through previous entry and exit, or whether a country never joins the IO at all, as the United 
States did with the League of Nations. 
 8. In fact, the United States’ departure from UNESCO was followed not only by that of the 
United Kingdom, but also by that of Singapore in 1986. UNESCO EXECUTIVE BOARD, REPORT BY 
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL ON BUDGET ADJUSTMENTS 6 (1997), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001087/108711E.pdf. 
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3. It should allow for differences among states; in particular, some states 
might be in a position to confer more benefits on their fellow member 
states than others, such as large countries offering access to their 
markets by lowering trade barriers. These differences are, in turn, the 
source of differential power among member countries within the IO. 
4. Consistent with the themes of this symposium, it should logically define 
and incorporate the notions of delegation and sovereignty costs. Even 
in the face of these costs, it should give countries an incentive to join 
and stay in the IO. 
5. Finally, it should allow for the possibility of partial accession to treaties 
and predict under which circumstances devices such as reservations will 
be allowed. 
The model we present below is able to address all these issues, so it is a useful 
prototype to study delegation relationships within IOs. In contrast to the 
standard setting, where the degree of discretion delegated is linked to the 
harmony of interests among the actors, in the international setting an IO’s 
authority will be circumscribed by the “biggest weakest link;” that is, the least 
internationally oriented country whose exit would cause the IO to collapse. 
The next Part reviews the relevant modeling literature on delegation in IOs. 
Then, in the third Part, we provide an overview of our approach and relate it to 
the terms of debate in the sovereignty literature. The Part that follows provides 
a formal specification of the model. The fifth Part solves for the equilibria of the 
model in general, while the sixth provides a detailed examination of a three-
country case with an integrationist IO. The last Part concludes with implications 
for the long run sustainability and optimal structure of international 
organizations. 
II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are many excellent studies of international organizations that 
emphasize the delegation relationships inherent in their establishment and 
operation. Daniel Nelson and Michael Tierney, for instance, have reviewed 
agency theory and applied it to World Bank environmental reform projects.9 
Other essays explore the ways in which countries circumscribe delegation 
relationships with IOs so as to limit agency losses.10 
There are, however, few formal models of delegation to IOs; rather, game-
theoretic treatments of IOs tend to explore IOs’ relation to the collective 
dilemmas that bring them into existence. The modeling tradition begun by 
Robert Keohane, for example, views international organizations as solutions to 
 
 9. See generally Daniel Nelson & Michael Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations: 
Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241 (2003). 
 10. See, e.g., DARREN HAWKINS ET AL., DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS (2006). 
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coordination problems that countries cannot solve efficiently through a series of 
bilateral agreements.11 A second line of reasoning, due originally to George 
Tsebelis, examines the impact of domestic bargaining on the nested or “two-
level” games of international relations.12 And recently, a third line of inquiry has 
emphasized the informational advantages conferred by membership in 
international organizations.13 
But given their description of international cooperation as simply a solution 
to a prisoners’ dilemma, these models cannot easily incorporate concepts such 
as sovereignty costs, partial association or, indeed, power in international 
organizations. Nor do they simultaneously address the questions of which 
policies IOs adopt and which countries choose to belong to IOs, let alone the 
more complicated issues of reservations and reciprocity. This article contributes 
to the literature precisely along these lines of inquiry. 
The model has as its basis the classic models of delegation relationships in 
political science.14 It is closely associated with the articles by Mathew 
McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast and by us,15 in which discretion 
was essentially defined as “whatever the agency can get away with,” rather than 
being explicitly circumscribed by the political actors delegating to the agency. 
But rather than require all other political players to act in concert to overturn 
an agency’s decision—such as when the House, Senate, and President must each 
approve a new law to counteract agency rulemaking—the setting for this model 
allows any single member country to unilaterally change outcomes by simply 
removing itself from the IO. 
III 
MODEL PREVIEW 
The theoretical framework for analyzing delegation in political science is a 
variant on the spatial model of political institutions, which assumes that actors 
have most-preferred policies—or ideal points—in some policy space, and they 
want to bring policy outcomes as close as possible to their ideal point. It is 
political institutions that determine who gets enfranchised into the 
 
 11. See generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEMOGENY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN 
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984). 
 12. See generally, e.g., GEORGE TSEBELIS, NESTED GAMES: RATIONAL CHOICE IN 
COMPARATIVE POLITICS (1991). 
 13. See, e.g., Leslie Johns, A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of 
International Bureaucrats, 61 INT’L ORG. 245 (2007); Andrew Kydd, Which Side Are You On? Bias, 
Credibility, and Mediation, 47(4) AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 597 (2003); Helen Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, 
Trade Negotiations, Information and Domestic Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups 8(2) ECON. & 
POL. 145–89 (1996). 
 14. See, e.g., infra notes 15–16. 
 15. See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS (1999) 
[hereinafter EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS]; David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran,  
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion, 38(3) AM. J. POL. SCI. 697 (1994) 
[hereinafter Epstein & O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures]; M.D. McCubbins et al., Administrative 
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON.  & ORG. 243 (1987). 
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policymaking process, under what conditions, and thus who wins and who loses 
at the end of the day. 
This setup is illustrated in two dimensions in Figure 1. The small dots 
represent the ideal points of member states in some international organization. 
The large dot indicates the status quo policy ex ante. The dotted circle indicates 
those outcomes that can be implemented under a rule limiting the 
organization’s discretion to d. 
 
Figure 1 : The basic game of international delegation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The policymaking institutions of the organization determine which way 
policy will move in response to various external events. If, for instance, all 
countries within the World Trade Organization (WTO) play by the rules, then 
the policy outcome is that each country in the agreement receives most-favored-
nation status. If one country imposes an import barrier in contravention of the 
WTO statutes, then by the organization’s rules the offending state should be 
punished. For the moment it does not matter whether the change in policy 
effected by the organization’s rules is implemented by a single individual, a 
body, or a completely mechanistic procedure of automatic adjustment. 
Within this context, delegation is defined simply as conferring to the IO 
some degree of authority to move policy away from the status quo.16  Of 
particular interest is the distance from the status quo to which policy can be 
changed—that is, the degree of discretion given to the international 
organization. We can envision limits on discretion as circumscribing the range 
of possible policies that the IO can enact—for instance, a requirement that the 
policy outcome may not differ from the status quo by more than some distance 
d, as indicated in the figure. Then unbounded delegation is associated with 
 
 16. In the domestic-politics setting, an agency can usually move policy unilaterally. In the 
international setting with free exit, the IO must induce each member state to change its policies, if 
necessary, to be brought into line with its dictates. 
03__EPSTEIN_OHALLORAN.DOC 6/9/2008  8:02:21 AM 
82 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 71:77 
infinitely large values of d; as d shrinks towards zero, less and less power is 
delegated. When d = 0, delegation ends. 
This setup has the advantage of making certain terms in the delegation 
debate susceptible to precise definition. Most importantly, sovereignty costs can 
be defined as the distance between the policy that a country would implement if 
it were not a member of the international organization and of the policy that it 
enacts once it has joined. In the figure, this would be the distance between the 
policy adopted by the international organization and each country’s ideal point. 
Therefore, sovereignty costs are no more or less than changes in policy 
outcomes. 
The model can also incorporate the fact that some countries join an 
organization fully, while others do so only partially. In the model, this would 
occur when a country is allowed to move its policy only part of the distance 
away from its ideal point and towards the policy mandated by the international 
organization. For instance, one possibility in the two-dimensional space drawn 
here is that a country would have to adopt the organization’s policy in the x-
dimension, but not the y-dimension. Finally, this framework can clarify some 
questions in the IO literature, such as whether countries with veto power 
actually delegate.  
Figure 2, for example, assumes that five member states are veto players (V). 
 
Figure 2: The delegation game with veto players. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consider status quo points that lie within the area enclosed by the dotted 
lines joining the veto players’ ideal points. Moving policy in any direction will 
make at least one veto player worse off, and thus in a single-shot game there 
would be no way to change a status quo like SQ. But a status quo outside of this 
region, such as SQ’, could be changed, as long as it is moved closer to the veto 
players’ desired policies. The larger the area inside the dotted lines—that is, the 
more heterogeneous the preferences of the veto players—the fewer the 
circumstances in which the organization can change policy away from the status 
quo, and hence the less discretion the organization will have. This finding that 
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organizations have more discretion when the preferences of their member states 
are more homogeneous could explain, for instance, why many European Union 
nations resisted expansion, despite the network benefits to be gained by adding 
more countries. 
Since there are circumstances in which the IO can move policy, being a veto 
player does not nullify delegation. On the other hand, since all changes in policy 
must make each veto player at least indifferent between the proposed policy 
and the status quo, veto players will not pay sovereignty costs by joining the 
IO.17 
IV 
MODEL 
A variant on the traditional delegation model captures the dual features of 
free exit and network externalities in international organizations. Although this 
variant borrows the intuition from the two-dimensional model discussed in the 
previous Part, here a uni-dimensional policy space, X = [0,1], is investigated, 
where the value of x corresponds to the amount of the public good or 
cooperative behavior provided. If X is the space of trade policy, for instance, 
then x = 0 would be an autarky with prohibitive tariffs, while x = 1 would be 
completely free trade. In nuclear proliferation, x = 0 might indicate no limits at 
all on nuclear development or testing, while x = 1 could mean an absolute 
prohibition on all such actions. 
There is a set  of countries, each of which has domestic 
costs and benefits regarding the policy chosen. In particular, we assume that, 
acting in isolation from other countries, benefits per unit of x are constant, 
while the costs are increasing, so that for Country i, 
 
 
 
Here,  is a parameter measuring the political importance of 
regulatory costs for Country . This formulation emphasizes the fact that, to 
varying degrees, countries will often provide some amount of international 
public goods on their own; even absent trade agreements, for example, few 
countries are run as complete autarkies. 
The relative costs of acceding to international demands rise at an increasing 
rate, relative to the benefits. So the political costs of free trade get higher the 
more domestic markets are opened, and eliminating the last ten percent of 
 
 17. Furthermore, member states of IOs often engage in repeated interactions, not just single-shot 
games. In this context, a state with veto power might be convinced to allow a policy change that it does 
not agree with in return for policy concessions further down the road. That is, individual decisions may 
impose sovereignty costs even on a veto player if the long-run tradeoffs are important enough. 
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pollutants that cause acid rain is more expensive than eliminating the first ten 
percent. Solving for first-order conditions shows that if only Country i existed, it 
would maximize utility by setting policy , where  is Country ’s “stand-
alone” ideal point. 
In addition to these domestic costs and benefits, each country can reap 
associational benefits by joining other countries in an international 
organization. Network externalities are captured by the assumption that each 
member state confers a benefit  on all other members of an IO. In trade 
policy, for example,  might be proportional to the size of the tradable sector of 
a country’s economy. In a mutual defense treaty, it could represent a country’s 
military capacity. If a subset of countries  join the organization as 
members, then potential associational benefits for each country are 
. When , total benefits are denoted as . 
In the game, the IO moves first, naming a policy level x. All countries then 
simultaneously and noncooperatively decide whether to become a member of 
the IO. Member countries agree to set policy at , while nonmembers can set 
policy wherever they like. Associational benefits are then scaled by the level of 
policy, so that they are equal to  for all member countries. The idea here is 
that, for example, the benefits of free trade grow as the WTO requires higher 
and higher levels of tariff concessions. So if every country in the world joined 
the WTO, for instance, but x = 0, then no free-trade benefits would accrue in 
any case. Thus countries in the organization receive total utility: 
 
 
 
from remaining in the organization. This yields an adjusted ideal point 
 if all countries become members. Each country’s 
“associational” ideal point  is larger—more internationally oriented, 
that is—than their stand-alone ideal point.18 
Since membership in international organizations is voluntary, countries will 
remain in an organization only as long as they receive at least as much utility as 
they would receive implementing their stand-alone ideal point; that is, as long 
as 
 
 
 
 18. This is the parallel in our model to Robert Keohane’s assumption that all countries would 
agree that they would be made better off if they could all be forced to contribute more to the public 
good than they each would contribute individually. See ROBERT KEOHANE, supra note 11, at 67–78. 
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Such a country is willing to pay sovereignty costs equal to , which is 
the distance from the policy imposed by the organization to the country’s own 
ideal point. An organization’s membership is globally stable when this condition 
holds for all . 
V 
DELEGATION AND FEASIBLE COALITIONS 
Assume that the IO wishes to attract member states . This Part 
derives conditions under which such a coalition can form, and if so, which 
policies the IO can enact. From the preceding discussion, it is clear that absent 
any benefits from international cooperation, each country will set policy at its 
ideal point . Furthermore, for any value of , there is an equilibrium where no 
state joins the IO, since an organization with no members cannot induce any 
one state to alter its policy away from its ideal point. Similarly, changing policy 
so that a particular country decides to drop out might trigger a cascade of 
defections, since the aggregate benefits of remaining in the organization have 
been reduced. The analysis will thus focus on the equilibrium with the largest 
possible sustainable membership in the IO. 
The greater the aggregate benefits  from joining the organization, the 
farther from its ideal point a given country is willing to allow policy to wander. 
So for a given policy x, potential member countries , and 
associated level of benefits , Country  is willing to join the organization as 
long as , Country i’s “delegation range.” Then 
all countries in  will agree to stay in the IO when these delegation ranges 
overlap; that is, when 
 
 
 
Order the countries in  so that , so that Country 1 is the 
low-demander and Country m is the high-demander. If , and , 
then it is easy to see that  for all . In other words, to 
check if a given delegation regime is stable for all countries in , one need only 
check that Countries  and —those with extreme ideal points—prefer to stay 
in the organization rather than revert to their stand-alone ideal policies. 
Formally, for a given policy level x, the overlap region  will be 
nonempty when , in which case it will be equal to 
. The key to the equilibrium is that the policy 
x generating this interval must also be inside it: we must find some x for which 
. Otherwise, the degree of internationalization necessary to generate 
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sufficient network externalities will ask too much of the low-demanding 
country.19 
When will the delegation ranges intersect in the appropriate way? The 
ranges  and  first touch at . The  needed for this is 
 
 
 
This is to the left of the intersection when: 
 
 (Equation 5.1) 
 
where  denotes the minimum level of benefits  that can support a 
coalition with member states . 
 
Thus coalition  can be sustained whenever . Three 
propositions immediately follow: First, cooperation is easier when its benefits 
rise; no surprise here. Second, all else being equal, cooperation is easier when 
the countries have homogeneous preferences, so that  is small. And 
third, cooperation is easier when  is large, so that countries’ stand-alone 
ideal points are more internationally oriented. 
The lowest policy level which sustains cooperation occurs when 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19. For example, the proposed United States–South Korea free-trade agreement is currently 
foundering over the issue of imported beef. The South Korean government would, in principle, like 
greater integration, but the political costs sustained by exposing the beef industry to competition would 
overwhelm any compensating benefits, and without such a provision the agreement would be too weak 
to attract U.S. participation. For the U.S. position on the issue, see Embassy of the United States, U.S. 
Free-Trade Pact with South Korea Would Enhance Partnership (June 13, 2007), 
http://seoul.usembassy.gov/413_061407a.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2008). 
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Similarly, the highest policy level which sustains cooperation occurs when 
 
 
 
This, in turn, is less than 1 when 
 
 (Equation 5.2) 
 
where  denotes the level of  above which all member states in coalition 
 will remain in the IO, even with . 
 
We thus have three possibilities for the equilibrium: 
 
1. : Coalition  cannot form. 
2. : Coalition  can be sustained for any 
 . 
3. : Coalition  can be sustained for any . 
 
In the first case, there is no way to sustain the proposed coalition ; the 
international organization cannot please all countries simultaneously. In 
particular, policies that would induce Country 1 to join the IO have too little 
spillover benefits to attract Country m, while policies that would keep Country 
m satisfied are too demanding for Country 1. In the third case, the organization 
has a relatively free hand; it can set policy as high as it likes (up to ) and 
still retain all states in the coalition, because the benefits from association are 
high enough to induce even the low-demanders to stay in the organization.  
In the second case, cooperation is possible, but only for a limited range of 
values for . Assuming that the IO implements the highest degree of integration 
possible, it will set , which is always greater than the midpoint 
between the ideal points  and . So on the one hand, outcomes in such 
organizations will be biased towards high-demanders; they pay fewer 
sovereignty costs than do the low-demanders. On the other hand,  
while , so it is the low-demanders who have power within an 
organization; outcomes change in response to changes in their preferences, not 
those of the high-demanders. The limits of an IO’s discretion are therefore 
determined by its “biggest weakest link,” or the lowest-demand country that the 
IO wishes to include in the organization. 
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VI 
EQUILIBRIUM WITH AN INTEGRATIONIST ORGANIZATION 
Part V detailed the conditions under which an equilibrium including all 
states in coalition  could exist, and if existing, the ranges of feasible 
policies that the IO could implement. It also detailed the basic tradeoff inherent 
in determining an IO’s membership: expanding the list of participating 
countries versus higher levels of integration. The next step is to derive 
predictions as to which of the feasible coalitions will actually constitute the IO, 
and to do this one must first specify the IO’s preferences over outcomes, for 
both the policy chosen and the extent of its membership. 
Analogous to the traditional delegation literature, one could assume that 
the IO has an ideal point within the policy space and tries to bring outcomes as 
close to that point as possible. That is, the IO could be modeled as if it were a 
state within the system, and this might be a reasonable approach for 
organizations that are dominated by a single country (as, arguably, the World 
Bank is dominated by the United States). Similarly, if policies are to be voted 
on, the IO might adopt the ideal point of its median member, or the pivotal 
member state in a supermajority or qualified majority voting system. 
Alternatively, one might assume that organizations have position-taking 
preferences—much as agencies are sometimes modeled as wanting to maximize 
their budgets—in which case they might take extreme stances on issues 
important to those who run the IO, regardless of the impact this might have on 
the organization’s reputation or membership. (This is one interpretation of 
UNESCO’s actions as detailed in Part I.) Another possibility is that the IO 
cares only about maximizing membership, regardless of the policy 
consequences. The United Nations, for instance, feels that it can only operate 
legitimately if it can boast global membership, even though this means that it 
finds itself hamstrung in many cases, unable to act without triggering a veto by 
key member states. 
Again, though, the translation of delegation models to an international 
setting provides extra possibilities. In particular, we assume that the IO has 
what we term “integrationist preferences,” meaning that it wants to maximize 
, the weighted sum of the policy positions for states in the IO. For instance, 
the WTO would be modeled as wanting to maximize the amount of free trade in 
the world trading system. Such a formulation means that the IO will take into 
account the fact that raising standards  will make trade freer for those 
countries that continue to participate in the system, but it might reduce free 
trade overall by inducing some states to exit. Thus, integrationist organizations 
will under some circumstances take into account the preferences of those 
countries less oriented towards integrationist policies, especially if those 
countries weigh heavily in terms of the potential benefits they offer (high values 
of ), or if their leaving the system could induce a cascade of defections by 
other countries. 
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We examine a version of this game with three countries, having ideal points 
. To simplify the analysis, we assume the countries are 
identical except for their ideal points, so . Since a nontrivial IO 
has more than one member, there are three possible equilibrium configurations: 
no countries join the IO (it cannot form a coalition around any policy); 
Countries 2 and 3 join the IO; or all three countries join. 
Equations 5.1 and 5.2 above provide the conditions under which either the 
coalition of Countries 2 and 3 or the grand coalition (GC) of all countries can 
be maintained: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If , then no IO can form, as network externalities 
are too small to entice countries away from their stand-alone ideal points. It 
remains to specify the conditions under which the IO will choose to set policy to 
attract only countries 2 and 3, and when it will attract all three to a grand 
coalition. The latter provides the IO with greater utility when 
 
 
 
Equilibrium outcomes when  and  are shown in Figure 3 for 
different values of network benefits b and Country 1’s ideal point . For any 
given level of ,  and  give the minimum values of  needed to 
sustain cooperation. For points where some cooperation is possible, the  
line separates those cases where an integrationist IO prefers the grand coalition 
to attracting only Countries 2 and 3. 
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Figure 3: Three-country equilibrium when IO has integrationist preferences. 
The Figure assumes that  and . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As indicated, in equilibrium, low values of  are associated with no 
organization at all ( ). High values of both  and  have the grand 
coalition ( ), and intermediate values have a coalition of Countries 
2 and 3 ( ). Since all points in the area showing coalitions of 
Countries 2 and 3 lie below , they all involve levels of cooperation with 
. For points above  but to the left of ,  is again less than 1, 
while to the right of , maximum cooperation with a grand coalition is 
possible. 
What does this diagram say about the membership and goals of IOs? First, 
they are most effective when preferences are homogeneous, so that Country 1 is 
less of an outlier, and when the potential benefits of cooperation are high. In 
those areas where the grand coalition forms, though, Country 1 pays fewer 
sovereignty costs and has more power within the IO when it is more of an 
outlier, because the IO will prefer to accommodate Country 1’s demands and 
will set policy in a manner that is sensitive to changes in Country 1’s ideal point. 
But unless the benefits from cooperation are high enough, there will come a 
point at which Country 1 is too much of an outlier and the organization will 
allow it to exit (or not give it sufficient incentives to join in the first place), thus 
eliminating Country 1’s sovereignty costs altogether but, of course, also 
eliminating any power or leverage that Country 1 had with the organization. 
This type of framework facilitates certain thought experiments with respect 
to specific incidents in the development of IOs. For instance, at first blush the 
interpretation of the UNESCO case cited in Part I is that the IO initially had 
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extreme position-taking preferences, so that it cared more about making a 
statement than retaining the support of certain major countries. If this view is 
correct, then one would look for a leadership change within UNESCO, possibly 
chastened by the exits of several countries, which would lead to new policies 
sufficiently reducing the sovereignty costs so that the United States and United 
Kingdom would return to the fold. 
But there are other possibilities as well. Say the ideal points of the United 
States and United Kingdom were to become more extreme relative to the other 
countries already in UNESCO—either through their becoming more 
conservative or through other member countries becoming more internationally 
oriented—so that an integrationist organization preferred to move away from 
the grand coalition. Then one would look to changes in the preferences of 
member countries to explain the reintegration of the defectors. Or say the 
benefits from cooperation were to fall so that it was no longer worthwhile to 
keep the United States and the United Kingdom within the IO. In that case, 
one would look to changes in technology or other elements of the international 
policy environment to explain reentry. Or perhaps it would be some 
combination of the above. None of these perspectives is necessarily the correct 
one; the point is that having a modeling framework suggests checking different 
possibilities and empirical correlates than would have occurred to researchers 
beforehand. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
One is tempted to say that delegating sovereignty is a bit of an oxymoron. 
Just like the U.S. Senator from Louisiana who insisted that his vote could not 
be bought, but it could be rented, in a world with free exit, sovereignty cannot 
truly be delegated, but it can be loaned. Nations participate in international 
organizations because it is in their interest to do so, and they can withdraw 
when this is no longer the case. This does not mean that no alternative 
arrangement might make the country better off, or that their preferred policies 
are always enacted. Barring coercion or extreme exit costs, though, 
participation in international organizations is voluntary and therefore should be 
seen as a natural extension of member states’ rights and an exercise of their 
sovereignty, rather than as a violation. 
Our intent in this article is to offer an extension of formal models of 
delegation that takes free exit and network externalities into account, and in 
which sovereignty costs, IO membership, and international policy can be 
addressed in a natural manner. The model shows that equilibrium conditions 
are straightforward to characterize and that, in general, low-demand outlier 
countries pay higher sovereignty costs but wield more power in international 
organizations than do their more internationally-oriented counterparts. 
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This model can be extended in a number of interesting ways. First, partial 
adoption of treaties can be integrated into the analysis by allowing member 
countries to adopt any policy , where  is a parameter indicating 
the proportion of the IO’s mandates adopted by Country . Such a country 
would then contribute network externalities equal to  toward the common 
good and, if other countries reciprocate, receive only  benefits in return. 
One could then solve for the optimal  for each country and see when an 
integrationist IO would allow such reservations as the necessary price for 
retaining the membership of certain key countries. We leave these and other 
extensions to future work. 
